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Economic analysis of law assumes that individuals with fixed preferences who face a 
choice repeatedly will behave consistently. Reality, however, is different. A driver 
sometimes drives legally and at other times speeds; a businesswoman sometimes 
defrauds the tax authorities and at other times pays her due. This paper uses the 
phenomenon of “probability matching,” well-documented in psychological literature, to 
provide a comprehensive theory of behavioral changes. By using experimental literature 
and by conducting a new experiment, this paper demonstrates that behavioral changes 
can be predicted, theorized, and can provide a basis for policy making.  
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Introduction 
 
Both criminals and tortfeasors incur costs of a probabilistic nature. In the case of 
criminal behavior, the criminal incurs a cost only if caught and prosecuted. In cases of 
negligence, a tortfeasor incurs a cost only if the damage materializes. Therefore, to 
determine whether a rational, utility-maximizing individual is likely to perform a crime 
or a tort requires knowledge of four variables: the probability that the cost will 
materialize, the size of the cost, the benefit the perpetrator gains from her behavior, and 
her attitude towards risk. Given these four factors, traditional law and economics suggests 
that individuals will act—consistently—in a way that maximizes their utility. If an 
individual repeatedly faces a choice between paying a parking fee or parking illegally, 
and her relevant beliefs and preferences remain constant, she will always make the same 
choice. If, on the other hand, she alters her behavior, this change must be attributed to 
changes in her beliefs or preferences.  
Using psychological tools, this article challenges this assumption and 
demonstrates that behavioral changes can be predicted. Most importantly, this article 
demonstrates that, contrary to the predictions of law and economics, an individual facing 
identical choices – even if her relevant beliefs, preferences, and attitudes to risk remain 
fixed – is unlikely to act consistently. A driver will sometimes drive legally and, at other 
times (and under identical circumstances) will speed. A businesswoman faced with 
repeated opportunities to defraud the tax authorities will sometimes cheat and at other 
times pay her due.  Yet, although individuals do not act in a consistent manner, their 
behavior is not erratic. It is sufficiently rule-governed to facilitate the rational design of 
enforcement mechanisms.  
This article has both descriptive as well as normative ambitions. Descriptively, it 
challenges a dominant tradition in law and economics – the tradition that holds that 
individuals are expected to act consistently when they face identical choices, and that 
inconsistencies are to be explained by changes in preferences or beliefs. Normatively, the 
article challenges some of the most established recommendations of law and economics 
in the areas of law enforcement, sentencing policy, and tort law.  
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This article is divided into four sections. Section I provides the psychological 
background. It presents the robust findings of the psychological literature concerning 
“probability matching.” Probability matching is the term used by psychologists to 
describe the behavior of individuals who repeatedly face choices involving probabilistic 
costs and benefits. Probability matching suggests that, when repeatedly faced with such 
choices, individuals do not act consistently in a way that maximizes their utility. Rather, 
they choose to adopt a “mixed strategy” in which they make choices dictated by the 
probability of the costs or benefits. Section II explains the relevance of probability 
matching to the legal context and also describes an experiment designed to illustrate this 
relevance. This experiment—the “traffic warden experiment”—demonstrates that 
individuals facing a choice between either conforming to the law or violating it and 
facing the risk of a fine do not act in a way that maximizes their payoffs. Instead, they 
manifest behavior patterns that fit the predictions of probability matching. Section III 
explores the normative implications of this approach. In particular, it demonstrates that an 
optimal enforcement system ought to take into account the inconsistencies predicted by 
probability matching. A policy-maker or legislator ought to base their policies, not on the 
assumption that individuals always maximize their payoffs, but rather on the 
understanding that people sometimes behave as "probability-matchers.” Probability 
matching provides an intelligible framework to articulate the common accusation that 
human beings are inconsistent and, at the same time, to account for this inconsistency in a 
way that is conducive to the legal regulation of behavior.   
  
 
I. Probability Matching: Psychological Background   
 
Assume that you are given a die with 4 red faces and 2 white faces. You are told 
that the die will be rolled 100 times. You are also told that if you predict correctly the 
color of each roll, you will receive a reward—$10 for a correct “red” guess and $10 for a 
correct “white” guess. What would one do under these circumstances? What ought one to 
do under these circumstances?  
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  The “maximization rule”—the rule that maximizes the expected value of the 
awards—would require participants to choose the red color in all 100 rolls. Yet, subjects 
participating in such game who were asked to evaluate alternative strategies often 
preferred a mixed approach.
1 According to this strategy, bets would be divided so that red 
is chosen in 2/3 of the rolls and white in 1/3 of the rolls.
2 Psychologists have labeled this 
phenomenon as “probability matching.” Probability matching can be defined as the 
disposition to adopt a mixed strategy dictated by the relative frequency, even when the 
utility-maximizing strategy would be to always behave in a way that presupposes that the 
most probable event would occur.  
  “Probability matching” implies that there is a difference between the behavior of 
participants in a single-shot game with binary results and cases involving repeated games.  
In a single roll of a die with 4 red faces and 2 white faces, individuals consistently pick 
the red color. In contrast, when presented with a repeated game involving many rolls of 
the die, subjects do not simply decide as if each game is independent. Instead, their 
guesses are guided by the ratio of relevant probabilities and consequently they adopt a 
mixed strategy. Put differently, while in a one-shot game with binary options individuals 
are expected to maximize their prospects of success, in repeated choice scenarios they 
will behave in a sub-optimal manner.
3 
  Probability matching has been extensively documented in the psychological 
literature.
4 Several tens of experiments have showed that participants consistently deviate 
                                                 
1  For studies reporting such results, see, for example, Ido Gal & Jonathan Baron, Understanding Repeated 
Simple Choices, 2 THINKING AND REASONING 81 (1996) (reporting that a majority of college students 
participating in a die-rolling experiment did not opt for the maximization rule); Richard F. West & Keith E. 
Stanovich,  Is Probability Matching Smart? Associations between Probabilistic Choices and Cognitive 
Ability, 31(2) MEMORY & COGNITION 243 (2003) (finding that most students rejected the maximization rule 
and instead applied the strategy of "probability matching".).  
2  Choosing the red color for all 100 rolls produces, on average, 66.6 correct red guesses. The "probability 
matching" strategy provides 44.4 correct red guesses (2/3 × 2/3) and 11.1 (1/3 × 1/3) correct white guesses, 
thus a total of roughly 55.5 correct guesses.  
3 The fact that participants fail to maximize their payoffs in the repeated choice scenarios has attracted the 
attention of many theorists. Kenneth Arrow, for example, noted that "We have here an experimental 
situation which is essentially of an economic nature in the sense of seeking to achieve a maximum of 
expected reward, and yet the individual does not in fact, at any point, even in a limit, reach the optimal 
behavior." Kenneth J. Arrow, Utilities, Attitudes, Choices: A Review Note. 26 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1958) 
4 See, for example, Edmund Fantino & Ali Esfandiari, Probability Matching: Encouraging Optimal 
Responding in Humans, 56 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 58 (2002), stating that 
“Probability matching is an extremely robust phenomenon”.   
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from the maximization rule.
5 In one of the classical experiments, duplicated many times, 
participants observed a long series of flashing lights, some of them green and others red. 
The flashing lights appeared on the screen randomly, but such that 70% of the flashing 
lights were green and 30% red.  At the end of an initial session in which the lights were 
shown, participants were asked to guess the color of the next 100 flashing lights. 
Consistent with the probability matching phenomenon, 70% of the time participants 
predicted that the next flashing light would be green, and 30% of the time that it would be 
red. Participants were capable of observing the probability of the lights, but failed to 
pursue the optimal strategy—the strategy most likely to maximize their pay-offs. Instead 
of always choosing green and thus guessing correctly in 70% of cases, they adjusted their 
answers to the relative frequency of the events.  
  Studies indicate that subjects apply “probability matching” for gains as well as for 
losses. For example, in one version of the flashing lights experiment, participants were 
given monetary rewards for every correct guess. In another form of the experiment, 
subjects were granted a certain amount of money as an endowment, and a fine was 
imposed for every incorrect answer. The results showed that in both instances individuals 
correctly observed the probability of each color, but failed to adopt the rule that 
maximizes their prospects of successful guess.
6 Instead, subjects consistently followed 
                                                 
5  For an overview of the literature see, for example, Nir Vulkan, An Economist's Perspective On 
Probability Matching, 14 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1 (2003). While probability matching has been 
extensively documented, several experiments have shown that it may decrease (although not be eliminated) 
under some circumstances. Some studies, for example, have shown that after a very large number of trials, 
some individuals’ asymptotic performance exceeds that predicted by probability matching. High monetary 
reward/fines for correct/incorrect guesses were also shown to occasionally induce individuals to improve 
their choices and apply strategies that produced better results than the ones generated by probability 
matching. Nevertheless, even under such circumstances, individuals often continued to “match 
probabilities” rather than apply the maximization rule. For experiments in which participants used the 
strategy of probability matching despite substantial monetary payoff and the repetition of the experiment 
see, for example, Sigel Sideny & D.A. Goldstein, Decision Making Behavior in a Two Choice Uncertain 
Outcome Situation,  57 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1959); Alice F. Healy & Michael 
Kubovy, Probability Matching and the Formation of Conservative Decision Rules in a Numerical Analog 
of Signal Detection, 7 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN LEARNING AND MEMORY 344 
(1981); Hal. R. Arkes & Robyn M. Dawes, Factors Influencing the Use of a Decision Rule in a 
Probabilistic Task, 37 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 93 (1986); Daniel 
Friedman & Dominic W. Massaro, Understanding Variability in Binary and Continuous  Choice, 5(3) 
PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW 370 (1998). 
6 See, for example, P.  SUPPES  &  R.  C.  ATKISON,  MARKOV  LEARNING  MODELS FOR MULTI  PERSON 
INTERACTIONS (1960) conducting three similar experiments differing only in the payoff and penalty given 
for correct and incorrect guess. In the first experiment, 1 cent was given for a correct guess and 0 for an 
incorrect guess. In the second experiment, 5 cents were given for a correct guess and a penalty of 5 cents 
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the “probability matching” strategy. Experiments also showed that probability matching 
is insensitive to the distribution of the probabilities. Whether the proportion between 
green and red lights was 90% to 10% or 60% to 40% proved to be insignificant. In all 
cases subjects predict the subsequent flashings in accordance with the observed 
probability of each color.
7  
Additional experiments indicate individuals react in a similar manner when 
confronted with asymmetrical payoffs. In such cases, the rates at which subjects choose 
each option are equal to the corresponding expected gain. Rather than simply following 
the probability of each event, participants also adjust for the different payoffs.
8  For 
example, if in the red/white die experiment, the reward for a correct “red” guess is $6, 
and $15 for a correct “white” guess, subjects will continue to apply a mixed strategy but 
increase the rate in which they choose “white.”  As the expected payoff for a "red" guess 
is $4 (2/3 × 6), and $5 (1/3 × 15) for a white guess, bets will be divided in a 4 to 5 ratio.  
Signal detection and prediction of die rolling are rather artificial environments. 
Yet probability matching has also occurred in more natural settings, representing more 
realistic everyday dilemmas.
9 For example, in a series of studies, participants were asked 
                                                                                                                                                 
for incorrect guess. Finally, in the experiment third format, a correct guess was worth 10 cents and an 
incorrect guess triggered a penalty of 10 cents. In all three variations subjects generally applied the strategy 
of probability matching rather than the maximization rule. Other experiments in which penalty for incorrect 
guess was the only payoff (that is, correct guess triggered no reward and no penalty) similarly demonstrated 
subjects' use of the “matching” strategy. See Vulkan, supra note 5 at 9.    
7 See, for example, W. K. Estes & J. H. Strughan, Analysis of A Verbal Conditioning Situation in Terms of 
Statistical Learning Theory, 47 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 225 (1954) (reporting the use of 
the probability matching strategy in experiments in which probability distribution was rather extreme, that 
is, low probability for a green light (15%) and high probability (85%) for a red light); Myers et al. 
Differential Memory Gains and Losses and Event Probability in a Two-Choice Situation, 66 JOURNAL OF 
EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY 521 (1963) (similarly observing the application of probability matching 
when the distribution of the probabilities is almost balanced (60%--40%)).  
8  This is known as the "matching law", expressed by the following equation:  












Where R1 represents the rate of responding on one response alternative and R2 represents the rate of 
responding on a second alternative; r1 and r2 represent the respective rates of payoff for those alternative; 
and A represents the amount by which the payoff for one alternative differs from the amount of the payoff 
for the other alternative. See generally MICHAEL DAVISON & DIANE MCCARTHY, THE MATCHING LAW: A 
RESEARCH REVIEW (1988).  
9  For a general overview, see Wayne W. Fisher & James E. Mazur, Basic and Applied Research on Choice 
Responding, 30 JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 387 (1997)  
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to assume the role of medical practitioners making diagnoses about a series of patients.
10 
Subjects had initially learned the correlation between the existence of certain symptoms 
and the likelihood for the disease. Subsequently, participants were presented with the 
description of the symptoms of several patients. To maximize the probability of correct 
diagnoses, participants should have consistently chosen the outcome (disease/not disease) 
that had been more frequently associated with that particular symptom pattern. 
Participants, however, appear to make judgments which are guided by the ratio of 
probabilities. In one study, for example, one particular symptom pattern predicted a 
disease with 78% probability. To maximize the probability of correct diagnoses, 
participants should diagnose any person with the relevant symptoms as having this 
particular disease. Yet participants in this experiment attributed the disease only to 75% 
of the cases involving these symptoms.
11    
A recent study strengthens the conjecture that individuals use probability 
matching in real life situations. Researchers investigate basketball players’ allocation of 2 
and 3 point shots.
12 Basketball players typically face two options: shooting a long-range 3 
point shot, or a short-range 2 point shot. Accumulated data from NCAA and NBA games 
showed that probability matching successfully predicts the ratio in which players choose 
between these options. Assume, for example, that a certain player scores, in average, 
every other 2 point shot, but only one sixth of his 3 point shots. The expected utility of 
the former is thus 1 point, while only 0.5 point for the latter. If the player followed the 
                                                 
10 For description of these studies and their results, see David R. Shanks et al. A Re-examination of 
Probability Matching and Rational Choice, 51 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING. 233, 235 (2002). For another 
recent study using real life setting see Michael H. Brinbaum & Sandra V. Wakcher, Web-based 
Experiments Controlled by JavaScript: An Example from Probability Learning, 34(2) BEHAVIOR 
RESEARCH  METHODS,  INSTRUMENTS,  &  COMPUTERS 189 (2002) (demonstrating participants applied 
probability-matching strategy in a horse race scenario in which participants had to predict the winner in 
each of a series of races).   
11 David R. Shanks, A connectionism account of base-rate biases in categorization 3 CONNECTION SCIENCE 
143 (1991) 
12 Timothy R. Vollmer & Jason Bourret, An Application of the Matching Law to Evaluating the Allocation 
of Two-and-Three-Point Shots by College Basketball Players, 33 JOURNAL OF APPLIED  BEHAVIOR 
ANALYSIS 137 (2000) (finding that for players with substantial playing time, results showed that the overall 
distribution of two-and-three point shots was predicted by the “probability matching” strategy and not the 
maximization rule). Vollmer and Bourret's original research used data regarding NCAA players. 
Subsequent research, using data regarding NBA games, has also shown the applicability of the "matching 
law" for the allocation of shots. See Jason Bourret & Timothy R. Vollmer, Basketball and the Matching 
Law, 3 BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGY TODAY 2, 4 (2003)  
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strategy that maximizes his prospects of winning, he would shoot only short-range shots. 
The data, however, indicate otherwise. Basketball players generally apply the strategy of 
“probability matching.” The allocation of shots follows the relative payoff each shot 
produces, considering the probability of scoring and the point to be awarded if successful 
(2 or 3 points). Hence, since the expected payoff for a 2 point shot is twice the expected 
payoff for a 3 point shot, the player shoots one long-range shot for every two short-range 
shots.
13    
  The robustness of the probability matching phenomenon is further indicated by its 
occurrence even when the subject is cued about the correct strategy to pursue. For 
example, in the flashing lights experiments, instructing subjects that winning the game 
requires guessing correctly only 75% of the time - when green lights were to be flashed 
75% of the time – did not induce subjects to apply the maximization rule.
14 For every 
several greens, subjects continued to occasionally guess red. Similarly, even explicitly 
informing the subjects in the lights experiment of the exact probabilities increased the 
number of correct guesses but did not lead participants to adopt the maximization rule.
15   
  Why do people prefer to adopt the probability matching strategy to the 
maximization rule? One can only speculate, but it seems that the explanation is partly 
grounded in the instinctive wishes of participants to prefer a strategy that can guarantee 
full success (with very little probability) over a strategy that would yield a relatively large 
                                                 
13 Under some circumstances, it is rational for players to choose the type of shot that is less likely to 
maximize their payoff. With only moments to the end of the game, for example, a rational player should 
immediately shoot the ball regardless of the expected payoff.  Considering, however, that such shots are not 
frequent, Vollmer and Bourret’s use of only players with substantial playing time and number of shots 
ensures that such rare shots will not affect the final results. Sub-optimal allocation of shots, to some degree, 
can be a rational strategy. By diversifying the types of shots, a player makes it more difficult for his 
opponent to anticipate his next shot. Yet, this cannot explain the consistent results in Vollmer and Bourret’s 
study. Diversification would justify only a certain percentage of sub-optimal shots. As Vollmer and Bourret 
indicate, however, the ratio of shots is different from player to player. Probability matching thus appears to 
be the only account for the data.  
14 See Fantino & Esfandiari, supra note 4 at 62. See also Arkes & Dawes, supra note 5 at  
15 Id.  See also Michael H. Birinbaum & Sandra W. Wakcher, supra note 10 at 197 (concluding from their 
results that that despite “explicit instructions concerning the optimal strategy, accompanied by information 
about the probability of events … [participants’] performance still falls well short of optimal behavior”). 
For another familiar experiment see Richard C. Nies, Effects of Probable Outcome Information on Two-
Choice Learning, 64 Journal of Experimental Psychology 430-433 (1962) (reporting that providing 
participants the exact probability for each possible outcome made only 4 of the 192 participants to attain 
the optimal strategy of always predicting the more likely event). 
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number of correct guesses, but would inevitably lead to some errors.
 16 Choosing “red” in 
all 100 rolls guarantees a large number of correct guesses, but inevitably produces wrong 
guesses about 1/3 of the time; after all red is expected to appear in only 2/3 of the rolls. 
Using instead probability matching (that is, guessing red in 2/3 of the rolls and white in 
1/3) can yield, even if with little chance, 100 correct guesses. 
  Some scholars have argued that probability matching might actually be a rational 
strategy.
17 Using insights from game theory, it has been shown that opting for the less 
frequent event can be efficient in competitive environments with multiple agents. 
Assuming payoff is constant, because it is expected that most subjects will choose the 
more frequent event, this payoff will be distributed among many. In contrast, choosing 
the less frequent event promises the decision maker the whole payoff, undivided, when it 
materializes.
18 Consider, for example, the die-rolling experiment. If the game is 
conducted with multiple players, it can be rational to occasionally select “white” rather 
than “red.” Although “white” is the less frequent event, since most players choose “red,” 
each will receive only a small part of the prize. A decision maker choosing “white,” 
however, will receive the prize alone, which may more than compensate for the reduced 
chances of winning. As such, the wide application of the probability matching strategy 
can be viewed as a rule of thumb, appropriate to many of the environments in which 
individuals interact. Some environments, however, are not competitive. In such 
environments application of the maximization rule would have produced better results.   
 
 
                                                 
16 See Arkes & Dawes, supra note 5 at 94 (explaining that individuals avoid adopting strategies that are 
“blatantly imperfect”, securing for example a hit rate of 70%, even if any other strategy is statistically 
inferior). Several studies have suggested that subjects, even if told and demonstrated that the sequence is 
random, tend to believe there is nevertheless a pattern. Probability matching occurs because "[a]ny 
reasonable pattern hypothesized by the subjects would have to match frequency if it were to be a correct 
hypothesis." George Wolford, Michael B. Miller, and Michael Gazzaniga, The Left Hemisphere's Role in 
Hypothesis Formation, 20. RC64 THE  JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2000). See also Fantino & 
Esfandiari, supra note 4 at 59 (suggesting probability matching occurs because "subjects in probability-
matching task are attempting to devise a strategy in which they are correct on close to 100% of trials.").  
17  See e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD 204-06 (2000) 
(arguing that while the maximization rule is efficient in social isolation, probability matching can be the 
optimal strategy in many contexts involving social interaction). 
18 See, e.g., CHARLES. R. GALLISTEL, THE ORGANIZATION OF LEARNING, Ch. 11 (1990) (explaining that 
probability matching can be the most efficient strategy in competitive environments.)  
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  II. Probability Matching and Criminal/Negligent Behavior  
 
A.  Introduction 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In sub-section B we demonstrate the 
relevance of probability matching to law-related behavior. More specifically, we argue 
that traditional economic analysis of law cannot provide a useful theory concerning 
behavioral changes. While it concedes that the same individual facing identical choices 
behaves inconsistently, these differences are not properly theorized. In contrast, 
probability matching can provide useful predictions concerning preference changes. In 
sub-section C we present the results of a simple experiment designed to investigate the 
relevance of probability matching to legal contexts. Most significantly, both sections 
demonstrate that behavioral changes can be explained and theorized in a way that so far 
has not been exploited by legal theorists. 
  
B. Probability Matching as Predictive of Criminal/Negligent Behavior 
 
Different individuals who face identical options often make different choices. 
Economic analysis of law has traditionally explained this phenomenon by pointing to the 
different beliefs and preferences that people possess. Some individuals find it particularly 
difficult to take certain precautions while others are disposed to take such precautions. 
Some individuals are willing to take greater risks than others. But what can explain the 
fact that the very same person can behave differently under identical circumstances? 
What can explain the fact that sometimes people speed on their way to work and park 
illegally while – at other times – the very same person will strictly adhere to traffic laws?  
In addressing this question, advocates of law and economics may take one of 
several tacks. First, behavioral changes can be attributed to changes in one’s preferences. 
A person, for example, can care either less or more about arriving late to work. Second, a 
person can become more or less risk averse, and changes in one’s attitudes towards risk 
inevitably lead to behavioral changes. Finally, it is possible that the perceived costs and 
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benefits of a course of action may change in accordance with the individual’s beliefs. For 
example, it is possible that the person speeds on days that he believes his manager may 
notice that he is late to work, or on days that he believes that the police are less likely to 
catch him. The common denominator of all these approaches is that changes in behavior 
must be attributed to changes in beliefs or preferences.  
This view has at least two ramifications. First, in the absence of special 
circumstances, there is no fundamental difference between the behavior of individuals 
facing the same choice repeatedly or facing that choice only once. A repeated choice is 
analyzed simply as a series of single choices. Mere repetition should not change the way 
in which a behavior ought to be analyzed by the social scientist.  
Second, and most importantly, this analysis implies that changes in the behavior 
of a person facing a recurring choice are erratic. Changes in one’s beliefs or preferences 
are mental events in one’s subjective world that economic theory cannot predict, control, 
or exploit for the sake of designing legal rules. As such, ironically, a theory that aims to 
provide a rational way of predicting and regulating human behavior leaves a central 
aspect of behavioral reality unaccounted for.  
  Probability matching is a tool that can be used by the legal theorist to fill this gap 
in economic theory. Using probability matching to account for behavioral changes 
addresses each one of these concerns. First, probability matching predicts that a person 
who confronts a choice repeatedly will make different decisions than when she confronts 
that choice only once. Second, probability matching provides a tool to predict behavioral 
changes in a way that is intelligible and rule-governed. Consequently, it can serve to 
harmonize what otherwise may seem as erratic behavior.  
  To illustrate, consider the following example. Assume that a driver stops at red 
lights. Traditional law and economics would suggest that one can conclude that the 
sanction for running red lights is sufficient to deter this person. In the future, this person 
is not expected to disobey a red light. It is possible that the person may change her beliefs 
concerning the size of the sanction or the probability of detection, or that she may 
become less risk averse. But, in the absence of such changes, one could predict that the 
sanction is sufficient to deter the person from running a red light.  
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Probability matching suggests that this prediction is wrong. Rather, it is likely that 
the person will sometimes run a red light and at other times will not. The person may 
have adopted a mixed strategy, and his behavior may depend on both the probability of 
detection as well as on the sanction. Probability matching is a tool which enables us to 
concede the existence and importance of behavioral inconsistencies without abandoning 
the hope of accounting for these inconsistencies in a way that is conducive to the legal 
regulation of behavior. The next section illustrates through an experiment concerning 
compliance with parking regulation, the relevance of probability matching to the legal 
context.  
 
C. The Traffic-Warden Experiment 
 
 
Studies demonstrating the impact of probability matching on individuals’ choices 
were typically conducted in contexts that did not have legal significance.
19 The “Traffic-
Warden Experiment,” presenting participants with a choice whether to pay a parking fee, 
demonstrates the phenomenon of probability in a legal context. 
Participants. A hundred and two undergraduate students from the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem participated in the experiment. The participants were recruited 
through a campus advertisement promising a monetary reward for participating in a 
decision making task. 
Procedure. Upon arrival, each participant was given instructions concerning the 
task by an experimenter. All questions concerning the experiment were answered and 
instructions were repeated until the participants indicated that they fully understood the 
instructions. During the instructions, the participants learned that the task would be 
repeated for twenty-four experimental rounds, and that they would be paid on the basis of 
their decisions in each round. Participants were encouraged to think carefully about each 
of the decisions.  
Participants were initially endowed with 10 New Israeli Shekels (“NIS”) to 
decrease the likelihood that the more unruly participants end up having to pay the 
                                                 
19 See the studies described in Part I.  
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experimenter.
20 Then participants were told that they drive a van and have to drop off a 
package. For every delivery of a package the participant is paid NIS 2. Yet, prior to 
delivery, the participant has to park the van and decide whether to pay or not to pay the 
parking fee of NIS 1. Thus, a participant deciding to pay the parking fee earns NIS 1 for 
each round. A participant who does not pay the parking fee and is not caught by a traffic 
warden earns NIS 2 for each round. Participants who decide not to pay, however, face a 
risk of being “caught” by a traffic warden and having to pay the fine. In order to 
determine whether a warden has detected the violation, participants were asked to roll a 
die. One face of the die was labeled “warden has come.” Every time the participant is 
asked to “deliver a package,” she must first decide whether to pay the parking fee. The 
die is then tossed. If it lands on the side labeled “warden has come,” and the participant 
decided not to pay the parking fee, the participant is fined for “illegal parking.” The 
probability of being “fined” is therefore 1/6 for each round.  
The same process is repeated twenty-four times. Twenty-four was chosen because 
it is not too large a number such that the participants would get bored and fail to take the 
task seriously and it is sufficiently large such that patterns of probability matching can be 
detected.
21  
Design. Participants were divided into three sub-groups of thirty-four, differing in 
the fine imposed for illegal parking. The fine for group A was NIS 3, for group B NIS 6, 
and for group C NIS 12.  
Let us compare the results as predicted by traditional law and economics and by 
psychological theory. Under traditional law and economics participants behavior depends 
upon their attitude to risk. We shall assume that participants are risk neutral.  
For group A (with a fine of 3 NIS) the expected cost of illegal parking is NIS 0.5 
(3 × 1/6), half the cost of the parking fee (NIS 1). A risk-neutral individual, attempting to 
maximize payoffs, would therefore never pay the parking fee.  For group B (with a fine 
of NIS 6), the expected cost of illegal parking is NIS 1 (6 × 1/6), equal to the cost of the 
parking fee. A risk-neutral individual would therefore be indifferent between paying and 
                                                 
20  At the time of the experiment, 4.5 New Israeli Shekel were worth roughly $1.  
21  Twenty four rounds may appear too little to replicate daily experience. Yet, the experiments described in 
the psychological literature indicate that increasing the number of rounds to several hundreds generally did 
not change the results. See references in supra note 5 
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not paying. For group C (with a fine of NIS 12) the expected cost of illegal parking is NIS 
2 (12 × 1/6), twice the cost of the parking fee. A risk-neutral individual in this group, 
attempting to maximize payoffs, would therefore always pay the fee.  
Probability matching, however, predicts different behavior. Recall the predictions 
of probability matching in the case of asymmetric payoffs.
22 According to this model, in 
group A, where the cost of paying the parking fee (NIS 1) is twice as much as the cost of 
being fined (3 × 1/6 = .5 NIS), participants are expected to pay 1/3 of the time; in group 
B, where the cost of paying the fee is equal to the expected cost of the fine the prediction 
is that a participant would choose to pay for parking 1/2 of the time. In group C, where 
the cost of paying the fee is half the expected cost of the fine (12 × 1/6 = 2 NIS), 














Rounds  Fee 
is Paid as 
Predicted by  
L&E 
 
No. of Rounds  
Fee is Paid as 
Predicted by  
Probability 
Matching 
Group A   1 NIS  3 NIS  0.5 NIS  0  8 
Group B   1 NIS  6 NIS  1 NIS  12  12 





                                                 
22 See supra note 8.   
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Results: Table B summarizes the results. The numbers in table C denote the mean 
number of times participants chose to pay the fine and the 95% confidence intervals of 





  Pay   Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Group A  3.08  1.186  4.991 
Group B  5.53  3.627  7.432 
Group C  9.68  7.774  11.579 
 
 
The first question is whether participants were at all sensitive to the different 
expected payoffs in the different fine levels.  
The results clearly indicate that participants understood the game and acted in a 
way that is sensitive to its payoffs, namely, to the size of the fine. The participants in 
group A (low fine) were less willing to pay than the participants in group B (moderate 
fine), and the participants in group B were less willing to pay than the participants in 
group C (high fine). The data was submitted to a one-way ANOVA,
23 with Size-of-Fine 
as factor. The effect of the Size-of-Fine is highly significant (F(2,99)=12.071, p<.001). 
Even more importantly, the linear component of the analysis contributed .998 of the 
variance accounted for, and was even more significant (F(1,99)=24.09, p<.001). 
  The second question is which of the two models – that of maximizing or that of 
the probability matching best predicts the result. 
Recall that, according to the maximizing model—the model that predicts 
individuals would look to maximize their payoff—participants of group A should never 
pay the fee and participants of group C should always do so. The 95% confidence 
                                                 
23  ANOVA (analysis of variance) is a statistical technique designed to test whether differences in means 
between experimental conditions are significant (i.e. whether it is reasonable to assume that there are real 
differences in the population) or whether one is able to reject with confidence the hypothesis that the means 
are equal (i.e. that the differences we see are just “noise” in the sample). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press  15
intervals appearing in Table B clearly show that neither of these predictions is met. Still, 
one may ask how close the actual means are to the predictions of each model. To do that, 
let us first look at group B. 
For group B, the parking fee is equal to the expected fine for illegal parking. 
According to both models, risk-neutral individuals would therefore be indifferent 
between paying and not paying the fee. The results indicate that individuals of group B 
are not indifferent; instead they are more often disposed to take the risk and not pay the 
fee. On average, a participant in Group B paid only in 5.53 of the 24 rounds. Group B 
manifested, therefore, a significant propensity not to pay. The propensity not to pay may 
have different explanations: It may be the byproduct of playfulness on the part of 
participants, or a disposition for risk-seeking behavior. Irrespective, however, of what the 
explanations of this propensity are, it ought to be taken into account in analyzing the 
results in groups A and C. Consequently, if we assume the same propensity not to pay in 
all groups, the predictions of both models can be modified taking this propensity into 
account. To do that, the difference between the expected 12 rounds of pay and the actual 
mean of 5.53 rounds (6.47) should be subtracted from all predictions. 
  Table C summarizes our results and compares them with the results predicted by 
the two models with and without the correction for the propensity not to pay. Column 1 
presents the average number of rounds the participants chose to pay. Column 2 presents 
the mean number of rounds a participant would choose to pay as predicted by the 
maximizing model for a risk neutral individual. Column 3 presents the means of the same 
model, adjusted. One peculiar result of this procedure is that the number of rounds in 
which people would be expected to pay according to these predictions is negative in the 
case of group A. Since this is impossible, one would at least expect a mean of zero. Given 
the natural propensity of participants not to pay, it is particularly difficult for 
conventional law and economics based on the maximizing model to explain the fact that 
individuals in group A – the group with the lowest fine – decided to pay, on average, a 
little over 3 times.  
Column 4 describes the results as predicted by probability matching. Column 5 
describes the projected outcome as dictated by probability matching, adjusted for the 





  1 2 3 4 5 





















NIS 3 Fine 
3.08  0 -6.47  8 1.53 
Group B 
NIS 6 Fine  
5.53 12  5.53 12  5.53 
Group C 
NIS 12 Fine   
9.68 24  17.53  16  9.53 
 
  
It is clear from the results that the predictions of the adjusted probability-matching 
model (presented in column 5) are closest to the actual means (presented in column 1). 
As table B indicates, in all cases the actual numbers do not differ significantly from the 
predicted value indicated in column 5. As such, probability matching best accounts for 
participants’ behavior in the Traffic-Warden game. 
 
 
 III.  Probability  Matching and Law Enforcement  
 
The last section has demonstrated that individuals facing probabilistic costs or 
benefits often behave as “probability matchers” rather than as “maximizers.” It also 
showed that this pattern of behavior is manifested in law-related contexts, e.g., when a 
person is faced with a repeated choice of whether to pay a parking fee or be exposed to a 
probabilistic fine. This scenario is quite typical to law enforcement contexts. Because it is 
impossible to place a police officer next to every stop sign or to audit all tax returns, the 
imposition of legal sanctions is inevitably probabilistic. As such, probability matching 
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has important implications concerning optimal law enforcement policy. This section is 
devoted to examining the ways in which probability matching can improve and enrich 
policy-making.  
For illustration, consider this example: assume that the police wish to deter 
drivers from illegally crossing an intersection. The only sanction for crossing the 
intersection illegally is $100 and the benefit of crossing it illegally without being caught 
is also $100. Assume, in addition, that drivers cross the intersection repeatedly. Finally, 
assume that a police car can be placed such that drivers who cross the intersection cannot 
see it in advance. Thus, the drivers’ behavior is determined solely by the sanction and by 
the subjective probability they attribute to the placing of the police car in the intersection.  
  Under the predictions of traditional law and economics, if drivers are risk neutral, 
it is sufficient to place the police car in 51% of the cases (or at least to make drivers 
believe that it is there in 51% of the time). This guarantees that it would be irrational to 
cross the intersection illegally since the expected costs of crossing it illegally are higher 
than its expected benefits.
24 Placing the car less than 51% of time is wasteful because 
drivers would never stop; placing the car more than half of time is inefficient since the 
same deterrence could be achieved with less investment.  
Probability matching suggests otherwise. Placing the police car 51% of the time 
would cause drivers to cross legally the intersection in roughly 51% of the cases.   
Increasing the presence of the police car to 70% of the time would therefore increase law-
abiding behavior. If the differential cost of placing the police car in 70% rather than 51% 
of the time is sufficiently low, it may be desirable on the part of the police to make this 
investment.     
  To illustrate the relevance of probability matching to optimal investment in law 
enforcement, consider the following case. Assume that every day 500 vehicles cross the 
intersection. Assume that a car crossing the intersection illegally imposes an expected 
                                                 
24  The benefit from crossing the intersection illegally, if not caught, is $100. If the police officer is placed 
51% of the time, expected benefit is $49 ((100% – 51%) × $100). The sanction for crossing illegally the 
intersection, if caught, is $100. If the police officer is placed 51% of the time, expected cost is $51 (51% × 
$100). Placing the police officer 51% of the time therefore makes it unprofitable for the drivers to cross 
illegally the intersection.  
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social cost of $1. Finally, assume that the marginal costs of placing a police officer in the 
intersection increase in the following way:  
 
Days on Which a Police 







First day  $100  $100 
Second day  $400  $500  
Third day  $1500  $2000 
Fourth day  $3000  $5000 
 
 
  Traditional law and economic analysis would suggest, under these circumstances, 
that it is irrational (assuming that the drivers are risk-neutral) to place a police officer in 
the intersection. As drivers’ costs from crossing the intersection illegally are equal to 
their benefit, they will cross the intersection illegally unless it is more likely than not that 
they would be caught. Therefore, deterrence will be achieved only if a police officer is 
placed at least 4 days a week (more than 50% of the time). In weekly terms, this would 
indeed save $3500 in social costs (7 × $500), but would require investing $5000 (100 + 
400 + 1500 + 3000) in enforcement. Any attempt to place a police officer less than 4 days 
would be a waste of money, as drivers would not be deterred from crossing the 
intersection illegally. 
  In contrast, if people are "probability matchers", placing a police officer for two 
days would be efficient. Every day that a policeman is placed deters 500 vehicles from 
crossing the intersection illegally, saving $500 in social costs. Drivers, noting that the 
police officer is present one-seventh of the time, will obey the light at the same rate – one 
day a week. Given that the costs of placing a police officer for a first and a second day 
are lower than $500, a policymaker ought to place a police officer in the intersection for 
two days.  
  This example illustrates that a policymaker relying on the predictions of 
probability matching may invest more in enforcement than a policymaker relying on the 
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conventional economic analysis of law. A small alteration of the assumptions can also 
illustrate that probability matching can justify a lesser investment in enforcement.
25  
In the last example it was assumed that social costs produced by criminal 
behavior (crossing the intersection illegally) remains fixed for every car. In some 
contexts, however, the marginal social cost generated by the illegal behavior is expected 
to increase for every additional level of activity. Under such conditions, even if one 
assumes that marginal enforcement costs are fixed, probability matching may again 
recommend a different policy than that mandated by conventional law and economics.  
Consider, for example, the dumping of toxic materials. Assume that the marginal 
social harm resulting from every additional unit of dumping increases. While one unit of 
toxic material is harmless, the second unit causes a harm of $100; the third unit causes 
harm of $200 and so forth. For illustration, assume that there is a factory which produces 
the same unit of toxic materials each day, seven days a week. Assume also that the only 
sanction for each instance of illegal dumping is $100 and that the factory gains $100 from 
each instance of undetected dumping. Finally, assume that the cost of employing a 
detection team to identify illegal dumping is $550 a day. The following table describes 
the marginal and total social costs resulting from illegal dumping.  
 
Number of Instances of Illegal 
Dumping a Week  
Marginal Social Costs  Total  social  Costs  
1$ 0 $ 0








                                                 
25 Assume that expected social cost due to a car crossing the intersection illegally is $2 rather than only $1. 
Traditional law and economics, under this condition, supports the placement of the police officer. Placing 
the police officer for 4 days would deter drivers from crossing the intersection illegally.  As such, $7000 
(500 × 2 × 7) in social costs would be saved, outweighing enforcement costs ($5000).  Probability 
matching, however, indicates that the police officer should be placed for only 2 days.  Because enforcement 
costs of the third and fourth days are $1500 and $3000 respectively, such enforcement is inefficient 
considering the fact that social cost saved for each day are only $1000 (2 × 500).   
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Under these circumstances, traditional law and economic analysis would 
recommend no enforcement. Because the benefit of the factory from illegal dumping is 
equal to its cost, the factory would dump only if it is more likely than not that it would 
not be caught. Deterrence, therefore, would be achieved only if a detection team is 
employed at least 4 days a week. In weekly terms, operating the detection unit saves 
$2,100 in social costs, but would require investing $2200 ($550 × 4) in enforcement. Any 
attempt to employ the detection unit less than 4 days would be a waste of money, as the 
factory would not be deterred from illegally dumping its toxic materials.  
Probability matching, in contrast, mandates operating the detection unit once a 
week. Such level of enforcement is expected to induce the factory to refrain from 
dumping once out of seven times; the factory would dump only six times rather than 
seven. Consequently, $600 would be saved, which outweighs the enforcement costs 
($550). A small change in the assumptions can illustrate that probability matching may 
also justify a smaller investment in enforcement than that demanded by conventional 
economic analysis.
26 
                                                 
26 Assume that the marginal social costs of illegal dumping increase more rapidly, so that the first 
unit of dumping is harmless, the second unit causes harm of $150 (rather than $100), the third unit causes a 
harm of $300 (rather than $200) and so forth. The following table summarizes the social costs resulting 
from illegal dumping under this modified assumption.  
 
Number of Instances of Illegal 
Dumping a Week  
Marginal Social Costs  Total Social Costs 
1 $0  $0 
2 $150  $150   
3 $300  $450 
4 $450  $900 
5 $600  $1500 
6 $750  $2250 
7 $900  $3150 
 
Traditional law and economics, under this condition, supports the employment of the detection 
unit. Operating the detection unit for 4 days would deter the factory from illegal dumping. As such, $3150 
in social costs would be saved, which outweighs enforcement costs ($550 × 4). Probability matching, 
however, indicates that the detection unit should be employed only for 3 days. Employing the detection unit 
for an additional day costs $550, but would save only $450 in social costs.  
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In sum, the preceding analysis demonstrated that if either the social cost of illegal 
activity or the costs of enforcement (or both) are not constant, probability matching and 
traditional economic analysis may support different enforcement policies. Differences 
may cut both ways: probability matching may justify both higher as well as lower 
enforcement levels than suggested by conventional law and economics.  
Legal scholarship has overlooked the possible effects of probability matching on 
the optimal investment in law enforcement. It has also failed to grasp the usefulness of 




IV Probability Matching and Legal Doctrine  
 
A. Introduction  
 
This Part examines legal doctrines that can be explained by the tendency of 
individuals to “match probabilities.” Section B explains the prevalence of “escalating 
penalties” in criminal law for repeat offenders, as well as its functional analogue in tort 
law—the imposition of punitive damages on “recidivist” tortfeasors. Section C 
rationalizes the practice of allocating subsidies only for those involved in repeat (rather 
than one-time) beneficial activities.    
 
B. Escalating Sanctions 
 
Escalating penalties are widespread in criminal law.
27 Repeat offenders are often 
punished more severely than one time offenders. Under the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s guidelines for punishment of federal crimes, both imprisonment terms and 
criminal fines are increased if a defendant has a prior record.
28 Likewise, specific statues 
often set higher penalties for repeat offenders. For example, hiring, recruiting, and 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20 INT’L REV. L.  ECON. 
127, 127 (2000) (observing that punishing repeat offenders more harshly “is a generally accepted practice 
of almost all penal codes or sentencing guidelines”.).  
28 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (1995, § 4A1.1, Ch. 5 Pt. A, and § 5E1.2).  
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referral violations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act impose a minimum 
fine of $250 for a first offense, $2,000 for a second offense, and $3,000 for subsequent 
offenses; in addition, “due consideration shall be given to …. the history of previous 
violations” in setting penalties for paperwork violations.
29  Similar schemes of escalating 
penalties characterize the treatment of violations of environmental, health, safety, and 
labor regulations.
30 The legal system seems to differentiate sharply between repeat 
offenders and individuals who commit a crime for the first time. 
Law and economics has struggled to provide a rationale for the practice of 
escalating penalties for repeat criminal offenders.
31 In fact, some recent theorists 
provided compelling arguments against the practice of imposing escalating penalties.
32 
Probability matching provides a novel rationale for this practice. Individuals who face a 
one-time choice to commit an illegal activity tend, as the experiment demonstrate, to 
behave as maximizers.
33 Consequently, it is sufficient to deter them by imposing a 
sanction whose expected value is larger than their benefit. In contrast, individuals facing 
repeated opportunities to perform an illegal activity may act as “probability matchers.” 
They may thus occasionally choose to perform the activity even if its expected cost is 
higher than its expected benefit. To provide an incentive for “probability matchers” to 
                                                 
29 See U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)-(5) (1997). 
30 For a detailed overview of laws applying escalating penalties, both federal and state, see David Dana, 
Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L. J. 733 (2001)   
31  Id.,  at 737 (“For economists and law-and-economics scholars, however, the principle of escalating 
penalties based on offense history is puzzling”); Winand Emons, A note on the Optimal Punishment for 
repeat offenders, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 253, 253 (2003) (“For the rather developed law and economics 
literature on optimal law enforcement escalating sanction schemes are still a puzzle.”). For some attempts 
to rationale the application of escalating penalties from economic perspective, see, Moshe Burnovski & Zvi 
Safra, Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders Be More Severely 
Punished?, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 341 (1994); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of 
Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, 46 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 303 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 305 (1998); 
C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., supra note 27. Neither of these attempts, however, provides a sufficient explanation. 
See Emons, at 254 (describing previous research and concluding that “[a]t the very best the literature … has 
shown that under special circumstances escalating penalty schemes may be optimal.”).  
32  Dana, supra note 30 at 737 (arguing that “the economic model of optimal deterrence actually supports 
declining penalties based on offense history for some categories of offenses, rather than nonescalating or 
escalating penalties,” since convicted offenders are more likely to be detected if they commit additional 
crimes.); Emons, supra note 31 at 254 (concluding that “optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than 
increasing”).  
33  See supra Part I.   
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completely refrain from violating the law requires a higher penalty. In the absence of a 
scheme of escalating penalties, individuals with repeated opportunities to violate the law 
would choose to commit the illegal behavior in accordance with the prediction of 
probability matching. 
34  
Arguably, the legal system could achieve the same purpose by imposing a harsh 
sanction for every violation, irrespective of the criminal history of the offender. Yet harsh 
sanctions are not costless and ought to be avoided if unnecessary.
35 First, high sanctions 
may overdeter. If there is a risk of accidental violation, or of an erroneous conviction, 
harsh sanctions deter legal behavior. Second, severe penalties eliminate marginal 
deterrence—the incentive to substitute less for more serious crimes. Since the solvency of 
the criminals is limited, there is a limit to the size of fines that can be imposed. Finally, 
severe sanctions increase enforcement costs, such as the costs resulting from long 
incarceration periods, or the costs associated with collecting large fines. Severe sanctions, 
therefore, must be avoided if more moderate penalties can achieve a similar level of 
deterrence.
36  
Escalating penalties serve, therefore, the purpose of deterring both one-time 
offenders and "probability matchers" at the lowest possible cost. The legal system applies 
                                                 
34  Consider the following example. Assume that law mandates that the minimum daily wage for a 
construction-worker must be $200. Assume also that there are employers who consider violating the law 
and hire workers for only $100. Finally, assume that probability of detection is 50%, and that employers 
consist of two groups: construction companies (potential repeat offenders) and private individuals 
(potentially one-time offenders).Setting the penalty, for example, at $300 is sufficient to deter risk-neutral 
private employers. The expected penalty of $150 ($300 × 50%) is higher than their expected benefit of 
$100. It is not sufficient, however, to fully deter the construction companies who repeatedly need the 
services of construction workers. According to the prediction of probability matching, construction 
companies will adopt a mixed strategy. If the company hires, for example, 200 workers, it is likely the 
company would underpay some of its workers. More specifically, out of its 200 workers, probability 
matching predicts it would underpay 50. The company faces a 50% chance to gain $100 and a 50% chance 
of being subjected to a fine of $300. This ratio of $50 to $150 (that is, 1:3) determines, according to the 
prediction of probability matching, that the company would underpay every fourth opportunity it faces. To 
induce the company to fully comply with the minimum wage regulations, a higher penalty must be imposed 
for any repeat offence. If, for example, the penalty for every additional offence is $30,000, the company is 
likely to pay all workers the proper amount. By imposing such a penalty, the company would face a 50% 
chance to gain $100 and a 50% chance of being subjected to a fine of $30,000. This ratio of $50 to $15,000 
(that is, 1:300) means the company, even if behaves as “probability matcher”, is not likely to underpay any 
of its 200 workers.  
35  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221-223 (6
th ed., 2003) 
36 As said by Bentham, “[p]unishment, it is still to be remembered, is in itself an expense: it is in itself an 
evil ... [one ought] not to produce more of it than what is demanded …”, Jeremy Bentham, PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch. XV, § XI. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art39  24
a price discriminating mechanism under which severe (and expensive) sanctions are 
reserved only for individuals that cannot be deterred by moderate penalties. Setting a low 
initial penalty serves to deter individuals facing the choice occasionally; higher sanctions 
are imposed only to deter subjects who face the choice repeatedly and are likely to apply 
a strategy of probability matching.  
The growing literature on escalating penalties focuses its attention on criminal 
law. It is, however, worthwhile highlighting the fact that a similar phenomenon can be 
found in tort law. Instead of using “escalating penalties,” tort law employs punitive 
damages to deter “recidivist tortfeasors.”   
One of the considerations courts investigate in deciding to award punitive 
damages is whether the defendant is a repeat tortfeasor.
37 As the Supreme Court recently 
acknowledged, the question whether the harmful conduct “involved repeat action or was 
an isolated incident,”
38 would be one major factor in imposing punitive damages. This 
principle has also been recognized by state legislation. State laws often explicitly 
condition the imposition of punitive damages on the defendant’s recurring behavior.
39 
Probability matching can again explain this doctrine. Consider, for example, an 
activity that causes harm only 50% of the time. When harm does not occur, the benefit 
from the activity is $100. When the harm materializes, however, the damage from the 
activity is $300.  Setting damages to the actual harm ($300) is enough to deter risk 
neutral individuals who face a one-time choice to perform the activity. However, if 
individuals face the choice repeatedly, such a level of compensation is insufficient. Their 
tendency to “match the probabilities” means that every fourth time they face the choice, 
individuals would perform the activity. Imposing punitive damages on repeat tortfeasors 
may serve to counterbalance the effect caused by the probability matching phenomenon.  
                                                 
37 See generally DOBBS, Id., at § 3.11(2) (noting that “[r]epeated misconduct or a policy of misconduct … 
is often an element in punitive damages cases.).  
38 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003) 
39 See, for example, D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3813 (1981) (providing that punitive damages may be awarded 
for “repeat violations” of consumer protection laws); IDAHO CODE § 48-608 (holding that imposition of 
punitive damages for unlawful trade practices is conditioned on “repeated” violations); IOWA CODE § 91E.4 
(holding that “an employer who, through repeated violation … demonstrates a pattern of abusive 
recruitment practices may be ordered to pay punitive damages”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2697 
(providing that punitive damages can be imposed only for “repeat” violations of the law concerning 
profiteering in prescription drugs).   
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To sum up the discussion, let us coin a new term: “escalating sanctions.” 
Escalating sanctions consist of the practice of escalating penalties in criminal law and the 
practice of imposing punitive damages on repeat tortfeasors penalties. Probability 
matching provides a rationale for the use of such sanctions.   
 
C. Allocating Subsidies 
 
The above discussion regarding escalating sanction finds a mirror image in 
another argument concerning socially desirable behavior. Probability matching indicates 
that individuals who face repeat choices for socially desirable activities may take risks 
that are too small. Consider, for example, an entrepreneur who can invest $100 in a 
project that is expected to yield, with equal probability, either $0 or $300. Although the 
expected benefit from the project is higher than its costs, a risk neutral entrepreneur who 
faces the choice repeatedly is expected to invest only occasionally in such projects. While 
most of the time the entrepreneur would invest, she occasionally would forgo the 
opportunity, due to her inclination to “match” the probabilities. In such cases, it may be 
desirable to increase the expected payoff of the project to induce the entrepreneur to 
invest consistently in all the projects.    
 
[To be added] 
 
D. Risk-Based Liability versus Damage-Based Liability 
 
This section investigates the debate concerning liability for the harmless 
imposition of risk – an imposition of risk that does not generate harm - in both criminal 
and tort law. In tort law, the question is whether liability should be imposed for 
negligence which does not result in harm. In criminal law, the question is whether 
criminal sanctions should be imposed for unsuccessful attempts. We shall argue that 
while numerous considerations (either justice-based or efficiency-based) should be taken 
into account in deciding when liability should be imposed, probability matching is an 
important consideration that justifies liability simply for the imposition of risk.  
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Legal systems may adopt different mechanisms for providing incentives to 
prevent probabilistic harm.
40 On the one hand, a legal system could impose a risk-based 
liability system, namely a system that imposes sanctions on anybody who imposes 
probabilistic harm regardless of whether the imposition of risk resulted in actual harm. In 
order to provide efficient incentives, the legal system ought to impose a sanction which 
would equal the expected damage of the activity.  
On the other hand, a legal system could adopt a harm-based liability system, 
namely a system under which only those who inflict a risk which results in actual harm 
are subjected to sanctions. In this case, the legal system could deter wrongful behavior if 
it imposes sanctions that are equal to the harm resulting from the behavior of the 
particular wrongdoer.  
Last, a legal system could adopt a mixed (risk-harm) liability system under which 
it imposes different sanctions on those who imposed risk which resulted in harm and on 
those who imposed risk that did not result in harm. Under such a system, those who 
imposed risk which resulted in harm would be subject to different sanctions than those 
who imposed risk which did not result in harm. Let us examine how these three schemes 
could operate in different fields of the law.  
Under a risk-based scheme, as applied to tort law, liability would be imposed for 
any imposition of risk. The amount of compensation under a risk-based tort system would 
equal the expected damage causally related to the wrongful conduct.
41 If, for example, 
this conduct were to involve a 50% probability of inflicting damage equal to $1000, then 
the defendant would have to pay $500 in liability damages. Similarly, a speeding driver 
would pay in accordance with the expected damages resulting from her behavior 
irrespective of whether the harm actually materialized.
42 The traditionally prevalent legal 
                                                 
40 For a comprehensive discussion, see ARIEL  PORAT  &  ALEX  STEIN, TORT  LIABILITY  UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY, Chap. IV (2001). 
41 See PORAT & STEIN, Id., at 103. 
42 Such a scheme is not merely theoretical. It was proposed by some legal scholars primarily on the grounds 
that such a scheme is more just. See, e.g., C.H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990); C.H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 
38 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1990). For a critical response, see K.W. Simmons, Corrective Justice and Liability 
for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1990). For further corrective justice arguments  see, 
E. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VALPARAISO L. REV. 485 (1989). One of the advantages of such a 
system is that it mitigates (although it does not altogether avoid) the problem of "moral luck," namely 
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position in tort law is that liability in torts can only be imposed when the plaintiff has 
sustained damage that was wrongfully inflicted by the defendant. Nevertheless, recent 
developments clearly indicate greater willingness on the part of judges to attribute 
liability on the basis of the imposition of risk.  Doctrines such as “market share liability,” 
“loss of chance,” and “evidentiary damage” allow courts to impose liability on the 
defendants, even if plaintiffs fail to show causal relation between the harm suffered by 
plaintiffs and defendants’ behavior. When applying such doctrines, courts often refer to 
the risk of injury to which the defendant wrongfully exposed the claimant as the criterion 
for determining defendant’s liability. As such, tort law is traditionally a harm-based 
system that increasingly recognizes risk-based claims.
43 [ 
    The question of whether to employ harm-based or risk-based liability can also 
arise in the context of criminal law. The legal system could impose (a relatively small) 
penalty on every person who attempts to commit a crime regardless of whether she 
succeeds or not, or it can impose (a relatively harsh) sanction only on those criminals 
who successfully complete the crime. Finally, it could adopt a mixed system and impose 
different sanctions on successful and unsuccessful perpetrators of crime.  
As a matter of practice, modern criminal law adopts either the mixed system or 
the risk-based system.
44 A greater emphasis on subjectivity as the cardinal parameter in 
determining criminal responsibility has resulted in the imposition of sanctions for 
attempts. In some systems the sanctions imposed for attempts are more lenient than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
arbitrarily different treatment of individuals with identical culpability. For the problem of moral luck, see 
the recent discussion by David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case against Moral Luck 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=475161). For a useful collection of essays, see MORAL 
LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).  
43  Consider, for example, a typical “loss of chance” malpractice claim. A doctor negligently examines a 
patient. Consequently, the plaintiff loses 30% of his chances of recovery and dies. Under the traditional 
harm-based approach, plaintiff’s claim is ought to be rejected. As it is more probable than not (70%) that 
the plaintiff would have died even if the doctor had not been negligent, the plaintiff cannot establish 
causation. Under the doctrine of  “loss of chance”, however, the doctor is liable for the risk she exposed the 
plaintiff to. More specifically, she is liable for 30% of the damage. For a review of American and British 
torts cases in which courts imposed liability based on risk rather than actual harm, see Ariel Porat & Alex 
Stein, Indeterminate Causation and Apportionment of Damages: An Essay on Holtby, Allen and Fairchild, 
23 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 667 (2003).  
44  Some commentators have noticed a transition towards a reducing the gap in the sanctions imposed for 
attempts and completed crimes. See Yoram Schachar, The Fortuitous Gap in Law and Morality, 6 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 12, 13 (1987).   
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ones imposed for the completed offence, while in other systems the sanctions imposed for 
attempts are identical to the ones imposed for the completed offence.
45  
There are many considerations that dictate whether to adopt a risk-based, harm-
based, or a mixed system. A risk-based system has advantages in that it seems less 
arbitrary and it mitigates the moral luck" concern. Corrective justice arguments may also 
support a risk-based system. Nevertheless, pragmatic, efficiency-based considerations 
often preclude the possibility of using a risk-based (and perhaps even a mixed) system in 
tort law.
46  
The purpose of this section, however, is not to evaluate all the pros and cons of 
risk-based or harm-based systems. Instead, it aims at investigating the relevance of 
probability matching to resolving this debate.  
Assume an activity which imposes a risk that may or may not materialize. As 
such, this activity (which could be either a crime or a tort) generates a probabilistic cost. 
Under a risk-based system, the person who imposes a risk is always required to pay a fee 
that is equal to the activity's social costs. Under such a system, the agent would engage in 
the activity if and only if her benefit exceeds the expected cost. In contrast, under a harm-
based system the person who imposes a risk is liable only if the risk materialized and 
generated actual harm. From the perspective of the agent, the fee is a probabilistic cost 
which will be imposed only if his activity resulted in actual harm. The agent in this case 
would behave as a "probability matcher." Probability matching suggests that a harm-
based system would lead an agent to adopt a mixed strategy in which she sometimes 
engages in the activity and sometimes does not, even if the expected cost of the activity is 
higher than its expected benefit. The deterrence resulting from a harm-based system is 
therefore inefficient. Optimal deterrence requires either preferring a risk-based system or 
                                                 
45  For a discussion of the treatment of attempts in criminal law, see Omri Ben Shahar & Alon Harel, The 
Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA.  L. REV. 299 
(1996). It is worth noting that historically this was not the case and that ancient legal systems, as well as the 
common law itself, used to endorse a harm-based scheme – a scheme which was gradually transformed into 
a mixed system and sometimes even into a risk-based system. 
46  See PORAT & STEIN, supra note 40 at 109-10. Porat and Stein argue that, in order to achieve optimal 
deterrence and ensure that victims of tort are properly compensated under a risk-based system, it is 
essential that at least most if not all risk-creators are actually found liable for the expected damage that 
originates from their wrongful conduct. However, unlike actual damage, imposition of bare risk is largely 
non-observable by potential plaintiffs. Moreover, even when risk-imposition is observable by plaintiffs, it 
often remains unverifiable at trial. Hence, it is simply unrealistic to use effectively a risk-based system. 
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imposing harsher sanctions than those that are expected on the basis of traditional 
analysis.  
Given the plurality of factors which bear on this question, it is difficult to 
establish that the choice of criminal law to adopt a risk-based (or a mixed system) and the 
recent transition in tort law towards such a system is in fact grounded in probability 
matching. Yet the discussion demonstrates that, in choosing among a risk-based, a harm-




Conventional economic analysis of law relies on the assumption that subjects with 
fixed preferences are expected to behave consistently. Without this assumption, law and 
economics fails to provide guidelines for policymakers. Reality, however, demonstrates 
otherwise; individuals often behave inconsistently. Probability matching enables legal 
theory to account for behavioral inconsistencies, to provide guidelines for policymaking, 
and to explain existing legal doctrine.   
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